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The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual illusion whereby a model hand is perceived
as part of one’s own body. This illusion has been extensively studied, but little is known
about the temporal evolution of this perceptual phenomenon, i.e., how long it takes until
participants start to experience ownership over the model hand. In the present study,
we investigated a version of the rubber hand experiment based on finger movements
and measured the average onset time in active and passive movement conditions.
This comparison enabled us to further explore the possible role of intentions and
motor control processes that are only present in the active movement condition. The
results from a large group of healthy participants (n = 117) showed that the illusion of
ownership took approximately 23 s to emerge (active: 22.8; passive: 23.2). The 90th
percentile occurs in both conditions within approximately 50 s (active: 50; passive:
50.6); therefore, most participants experience the illusion within the first minute. We
found indirect evidence of a facilitatory effect of active movements compared to passive
movements, and we discuss these results in the context of our current understanding
of the processes underlying the moving RHI.
Keywords: rubber hand illusion, sense of ownership, body perception, onset
INTRODUCTION
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual illusion whereby a fake model hand is perceived as
part of one’s own body. This illusion arises when synchronous touches are applied to a rubber
hand, in full view of the participant, and to the participant’s real hand, which is hidden from
view (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). After some time, most participants start to feel as if the touch
originates from the model hand (referral of touch) and that the rubber hand is part of their own
body (ownership). The RHI is a classical multisensory illusion that results from the dynamic
integration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive information from the hand (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Samad et al., 2015). The illusion is typically measured by questionnaires wherein participants
have to rate the feelings of ownership and referral of touch using visual analog rating scales as well
as by more objective methods, such as registering the pointing error toward the model hand when
participants are asked to manually indicate the location of their hands (“proprioceptive drift”)
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) or skin conductance responses (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003)
evoked by physical threats toward the rubber hand (Ehrsson, 2012). These methods try to evaluate
the presence of the illusion by showing that the illusion is present in one illusion condition without
doing so in the other control conditions. The illusion critically depends on the spatial and temporal
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the moving rubber hand illusion setup. Participants make brisk extension movements with their real index fingers (inside the box),
which results in the corresponding movements of the rubber hand’s index finger (on top of the box). Both hands are covered with latex gloves.
congruency of the visual and tactile stimuli (Makin et al.,
2008; Tsakiris, 2010; Ehrsson, 2012); therefore, contrasting
synchronous visuotactile stimulation and asynchronous
stimulation is one of the most commonly used comparisons to
test the illusion in otherwise equivalent conditions.
Studies have also been conducted to investigate whether the
illusion can be elicited with movements instead of with passive
visuotactile stimulation (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Dummer et al., 2009;
Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012; Braun et al., 2014; Caspar et al.,
2015; Jenkinson and Preston, 2015). In the current version of
the moving RHI, the finger of a wooden model hand moves
synchronously with the participant’s finger, which is hidden from
view (Figure 1; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). As in the classical
RHI, participants develop a feeling of ownership over the hand
when the seen and felt finger movements are synchronous,
which does not occur when they are asynchronous (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2014a). The moving version of the illusion depends
on the integration of visual and kinesthetic information on the
finger movements; however, unlike the classical version, it does
not involve tactile stimulation from an external object touching
the hand. The moving RHI can be induced with both active and
passive finger movements. However, in the former case, motor
control processes are additionally engaged, and the participants
experience a sense of agency of the model hand’s movements, i.e.,
they feel that they are generating and controlling the movements
of the rubber hand (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012).
At present, there is no reliable information on the temporal
evolution of the moving RHI. However, this information would
be relevant for both basic and applied research. From the
perspective of cognitive science, a more detailed description
of the temporal development of the illusion would enable
researchers to estimate the minimal time needed to induce
the illusion when designing their paradigms. Additionally, the
onset time alone could also be used as a behavioral measure
of the illusion. Moreover, the temporal evolution profile could
provide information about the different processes involved in
the illusion phenomenon. The elicitation of the illusion is
thought to be preceded by multisensory recalibration processes
during which visual and proprioceptive maps are realigned
(Ehrsson et al., 2004), and this process could presumably be
studied by using the onset-times as a dependent variable.
From an applied perspective, new knowledge about the illusion
onset time could be important for scientists who want to
apply the principles of body ownership to the fields of virtual
reality, teleoperation, and advanced prosthetic research. An
important goal here is to learn to induce ownership onto
various robotic and simulated body parts (Rosén et al., 2009;
Slater et al., 2009; Marasco et al., 2011; Caspar et al., 2014;
Ma and Hommel, 2015; Romano et al., 2015; Pavone et al.,
2016).
With respect to the classical version of the RHI, we only have
limited information about the onset of the ownership illusion.
Ehrsson et al. (2004) reported that it took an average of 11.3 s
(SD: ± 7.0 s) for participants to report a sensation of ownership
(Ehrsson et al., 2004). Lloyd found that it took an average of
6.52 s for participants to report a referral of the touch sensation
[see Figure 3B in Lloyd (2007)]. Therefore, we still have limited
information about the time-course of limb-ownership illusions,
and, to the best of our knowledge, no study has characterized
the onset time of the moving RHI. Interestingly, anecdotal
observations in our laboratory suggest that the moving RHI can
sometimes arise after only a few seconds, suggesting that this
manipulation of the experience of one’s own body can rapidly
occur.
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In the present study, we measured the onset time of
the ownership illusion in the moving RHI in a large group
of participants. We registered the time needed for repeated
finger movements before the participants started to experience
ownership over the model hand. We also compared active and
passive movement conditions to learn more about the possible
role of agency and motor control processes in the facilitation of
the illusion.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We tested 117 naïve participants (66 females, mean
age = 24.3 years, SD ± 5.2, range 18–48). All subjects provided
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the Regional Ethical
Review Board of Stockholm.
The behavioral paradigm used to induce the moving
RHI followed our previous published protocols (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2012; Figure 1). The participant sat at a table and put
their right hand into a wooden box placed 30 cm in front of
them. A life-sized wooden model of a human hand was placed
on top of the box and was covered with a latex glove. The
participant wore an identical latex glove on their right hand.
The right hand of the participant was placed inside the box,
12 cm directly below the model hand. A cloth was placed over
the participant’s right shoulder to cover the space between the
model hand and participant. We first tested the participant
using the moving RHI in the following four conditions, in
line with our previous study (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012):
active vs. passive movements and synchronous vs. asynchronous
feedback. The participant’s right index finger was mechanically
connected to the index finger of the model hand with a thin
wooden stick and two rings attached to the fingertips. In the
active synchronous condition, when the participant lifted their
index finger, the model finger made the same movement in
perfect synchrony. In the passive conditions, the participant
relaxed their right hand and the experimenter generated the
movements of the two fingers by pulling the stick upward (out
of view of the participant). In the asynchronous conditions, the
participant’s index finger and model finger were mechanically
decoupled by “unlocking” the stick into two separate parts, and
the experimenter then controlled all movements of the model
hand’s index finger. Each trial lasted 2 min, and the participant
either made active index finger taps at approximately 1 Hz
speed or experienced the passive index finger taps at the same
rate. In the asynchronous condition, the model hand’s finger
movement was delayed approximately 500 ms with respect to the
movements of the participant’s real index finger. Between each
trial, participants had a 30–45-s break in which they removed the
arm from the box and freely moved the arm and hand to relax
and eliminate putative carry-over effects.
Each condition was tested once in one trial. The order of the
trials was randomized across participants. After each condition,
participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire that
included statements of ownership [(1) “I felt as if I was looking
at my hand” and (2) “I felt as if the rubber hand was my hand”]
and control questions [(1) “It seems as if I had more than one
right hand” and (2) “It felt as if I had no longer a right hand, as
if my right hand had disappeared”]. The statements were rated
on a Likert-scale from −3 to +3, where −3 means “strongly
disagree,” +3 “strongly agree,” and zero uncertainty (“Neither
agree or disagree”).
Participants who affirmed experiencing ownership of
the model hand in the synchronous condition (Ownership
rating≥ 1) but not in the asynchronous (Ownership rating≤−1)
condition were tested again with the synchronous condition and
asked to verbally indicate the time point at which they felt that
“the rubber hand was my hand.” The experimenter timed this
response with a stopwatch. We repeated the onset measurement
three times to obtain an average onset time for each participant.
Between each trial, participants had a 30–45 s break during which
they were instructed to move their right hands to eliminate any
remaining illusion before the next trial was started.
A subsample of participants also completed a questionnaire
to measure delusional ideation by using the Peter’s Delusional
Inventory (PDI, see Peters et al., 2004). These results have been
published elsewhere (Louzolo et al., 2015).
RESULTS
Data were tested for normality using the Shapiro–Wilk test, and
the appropriate parametric or non-parametric tests were used. All
reported results are two-tailed unless otherwise stated.
First, we evaluated whether active or passive movements
induced the illusion of ownership in our group of participants.
For active synchronous movements, the ownership rating
was positive (Median: 2.0) and significantly higher during
synchronous compared to asynchronous movements (Median:
−2.0; Wilcoxon: Z = −8.974, p < 0.000). We noted that
in the active synchronous condition, approximately 80% of
the participants (=94) affirmed ownership, i.e., gave a rating
score of +1 or higher on the ownership related statement.
Similarly, for passive synchronous movements, the ownership
rating was positive (Median: 1.5) and significantly higher
during synchronous compared to asynchronous movements
(Median: −2.0; Wilcoxon: Z = −8.485, p < 0.000) (Figure 2).
Descriptively, we observed that 76% (=89) of the participants
affirmed ownership in the passive asynchronous condition
(ownership score ≥ +1). Therefore, participants experienced a
sense of ownership during synchronous, but not asynchronous,
movements. The active synchronous condition was significantly
higher than the passive synchronous condition (Z = −2.520,
p< 0.012), although the effect size was small (r = 0.15).
Sixty participants who had affirmed the illusion according to
our inclusion criteria (synchronous ≥ +1, asynchronous ≤ −1;
see above) were tested for the onset time in active synchronous
movements. The average onset was 22.8 s (SD 18.5; range: 3.0–
95.7). For passive movements, tested in 62 participants according
to the same inclusion criteria, the average onset time was 23.2 s
(SD 18.4; range: 3.7–82); see Figure 3. When comparing the
average onset time in the two conditions, we found no significant
difference (Z =−0.52, p= 0.958). Most participants experienced
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FIGURE 2 | Median ownership scores in the different conditions. Participants experienced the illusion in the synchronous, but not asynchronous, condition.
FIGURE 3 | Average onset times in the active synchronous (n = 60) and
passive synchronous (n = 62) conditions.
the illusion within the first minute; 97% in the active condition
and 95% in the passive condition took less than 60 s to report the
experience of ownership (Figure 4). Approximately 30% (active:
30%; passive: 27%) of the participants required less than 10 s.
We further repeated the analysis with those participants
for whom we obtained an onset measurement in both active
and passive conditions, allowing for a more sensitive within-
participant comparison. In this subgroup of participants (n= 41),
the active synchronous condition (Median: 2.5) was significantly
rated higher in terms of ownership in the questionnaire than the
asynchronous condition (Median:−2.0; Z =−5.598, p< 0.000).
Similarly, the passive synchronous condition (Median: 2.0) was
rated higher for ownership than the asynchronous condition
(Median: −3.0; Z = −5.597, p < 0.000). The active synchronous
condition was significantly rated higher than the passive
synchronous condition (Z =−2.106, p= 0.035).
In terms of the onset of the illusion, the average onset time was
20.9 s (SD 18.8) for the active synchronous condition and 23.7 s
(SD 19.5) for the passive synchronous condition. This difference
was significant (Z = −2.469, p = 0.014), with a moderate effect
size (r = 0.27); see Figure 5. We further observed that for 27 of
these 41 participants, the onset time in the active synchronous
condition was faster than in the passive synchronous condition.
Additionally, we ran a correlation analysis between the onset
times of active and passive synchronous movements and found
that both were highly correlated (Spearman’s ρ: n= 41, r= 0.756,
p< 0.000); see Figure 6.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we tested for the onset times of the
ownership sensation in the moving RHI. The active and passive
finger movements took an average of 22.8 and 23.2 s, respectively.
Most the participants, more than 95% in both cases, indicated
that they felt the illusion within the first 60 s, and it was not
uncommon to observe participants who felt the illusion in less
than 10 s. When testing the subgroup of the participants who
experienced the illusion equally in both the active and passive
movement conditions, we found that in the passive condition,
the illusion took significantly longer to elicit (23.7 vs. 20.0 s).
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FIGURE 4 | Frequency distribution of the onset times in the active
synchronous (top) and passive synchronous (bottom) conditions.
FIGURE 5 | Average onset times of the illusion in the subsample
(n = 41) that experienced the illusion in both the active and passive
synchronous conditions. The difference in the onset times was significant
(p < 0.05, see Results for details).
These results support the notion of the relatively rapid onset of
the moving RHI.
There is relatively little information available on the temporal
evolvement of the RHI in the literature. To the best of our
FIGURE 6 | Correlation between the onset times in the active and
passive synchronous conditions in the subsample of participants
affirming the illusion in both conditions (n = 41).
TABLE 1 | Percentiles for the onset times in the two synchronous
conditions.
Percentiles Active synchronous Passive synchronous
25 7.4 7.8
50 19.3 18.3
75 35.1 32.8
90 50.0 50.6
The median onset time for active synchronous movements is 19.3 s; for passive
synchronous movements, it is 18.3 s.
knowledge, only two studies explicitly reported the onset times
for the classical version of the illusion. Lloyd (2007) observed that
participants took an average of 6.52 s to experience a referral of
touch sensation, whereas Ehrsson et al. (2004) found that it took
11.3 s for their group of participants to experience a sensation of
ownership over the hand. In other variations of this experiment,
such as the “somatic” version of the RHI in which blindfolded
participants experience ownership of a rubber hand they touch,
the illusion was triggered after 9.7 ± 5.3 s of stimulation
(mean± SD) (Ehrsson et al., 2005). Additionally, in the “invisible
hand illusion,” in which participants experience ownership over
a portion of empty space, participants reported this sensation
after an average of 9.3 ± 5.0 s (mean ± SD) (Guterstam
et al., 2013). However, these illusions did not involve any finger
movements or motor intentions. Therefore, the present data add
valuable information about the temporal development of the RHI
phenomenon, and is the first to report on the onset times for the
moving RHI.
Detailed information regarding the onset times of the various
versions of the RHI would be valuable to applied researchers
(Table 1). For example, there is substantial interest in the fields
of virtual reality to use the principles found in bodily illusion
research to create illusory ownership of simulated bodies and
limbs in virtual reality applications (Slater et al., 2009; Ma and
Hommel, 2013; Maselli and Slater, 2013; Padrao et al., 2015;
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Pavone et al., 2016). In these applications, it is desirable to induce
the illusion as quickly as possible to enable the user to gain rapid
experience of the virtual reality. To the best of our knowledge,
only one study directly assessed the onset of the ownership
sensation in a virtual hand illusion using visuo-tactile stimulation
(Perez-Marcos et al., 2011). In that study, it took an average of at
least 36 s for participants to report the ownership illusion (see
Supplementary Table 3 in Perez-Marcos et al., 2011), which is
slower than previous reports on the illusion onset times in the
classical RHI (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Lloyd, 2007) as well as slower
than the onset times reported here for the moving RHI. This
result contrasts with anecdotal reports of ownership illusions of
full body avatars, which apparently can be experienced almost
instantaneously. However, it is difficult to compare the present
results directly with studies of full-body avatars in virtual reality.
Obviously, the use of head-mounted displays and computer-
generated graphics is one difference. However, more importantly,
in many virtual reality experiments, the location of the virtual
hand is directly superimposed on the location of the real hand
without the 12 cm distance between the hands, as in our
experiments (Perez-Marcos et al., 2011; Kilteni et al., 2012;
Padrao et al., 2015). Moreover, virtual reality experiments often
use head tracking and tracking of proximal arm movements,
so that when the subject moves his or her head or arm, the
environment and simulated arm also move accordingly (Slater
et al., 2009; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Kilteni et al., 2012; Pavone
et al., 2016; Bourdin et al., 2017). Therefore, in virtual reality
experiments, there typically are more multisensory cues that
could facilitate ownership than in our setup. Nevertheless, our
results suggest that when there is a spatial discrepancy between
the locations of the artificial hand in view and the unseen real
hand, the illusion takes some time to build up. In cases when
discrepancies are too large, on the order of 30 cm or more, the
illusion is abolished (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014b). We suggest
that future studies should investigate whether the onset times
can be used as an additional parameter to further characterize
the illusion of ownership in virtual reality applications, especially
those whereby the observed location of the virtual hand is not the
same as the location of the real one.
Similarly, this knowledge can also be relevant for the design
of advanced prosthetic devices for upper limb amputees (Ehrsson
et al., 2008; Rosén et al., 2009; Marasco et al., 2011), particularly
for those based on active movement control (Velliste et al.,
2008). Studies have shown that the multisensory principles of
the RHI can be successfully applied to robotic hand-like devices,
which can be controlled by the user. The experience of these
robotic devices can be associated with sensations of ownership
and agency (Caspar et al., 2014; Braun et al., 2016; Romano
et al., 2015), particularly once these include different forms of
somatosensory feedback by peripheral or central stimulation
(Raspopovic et al., 2014; Collins et al., 2017). Researchers need to
consider that the participant needs a certain time of stimulation
before they can assume successful induction of the illusion.
The present results can help to determine the minimum
time needed to induce the illusion in most participants. This
information is relevant for both applied research and studies
investigating the illusion in general. In previous studies, the
duration in which repeated multisensory stimulation is delivered
to induce the RHI can vary widely in different experiments,
from approximately 40 s (Ehrsson et al., 2004) to up 10 min
in some cases (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). In our study, most
participants (active: 95%; passive: 97%) reported the sensation of
ownership within 60 s (Figure 4). Therefore, future experiments
can design experiments with a duration of 60 s to reliably induce
the moving RHI in most participants, allowing for more efficient
experimental designs.
However, it is not clear why participants differ in their
responsiveness to the illusion, i.e., why some participants
experience the illusion within the first few seconds, whereas
other participants need more than 60 s before the illusion
starts and some never experience it. Previous studies of the
classical rubber hand paradigm found that between 60 and
80% of participants experience the illusion depending on the
criteria used to conclude successful induction of the illusion
(Lloyd, 2007; Slater et al., 2008; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2009).
This typical percentage of illusion responders is very similar
to our previous observations with the moving RHI (Kalckert
and Ehrsson, 2014a). It is not clear what determines the inter-
individual differences in the RHI, although one hypothesis is that
it might reflect individual differences in the relative weighting of
different sensory modalities in the integration process (Kilteni
et al., 2015; Samad et al., 2015). A higher weighting on vision
should facilitate the illusion, whereas a higher weighting on
proprioception should work against the illusion. Onset times may
very well provide a complementary measure to determine the
differences between individuals in the RHI paradigm that might
be more sensitive than the typically used seven point Likert-scale.
The present results reinforce our earlier conclusions that the
RHI can be elicited with both active and passive movements and
that the illusion is probably the same, or at least very similar
(but see the next paragraph), in these two cases. Both the active
and passive illusions were well affirmed in the questionnaire data
(80% or 76%, respectively, have an ownership score of ≥ 1 in the
synchronous conditions) and, eliminated by the asynchronous
condition, had similar onset-times in the larger group of
participants (n = 60), and the onset-times were significantly
correlated. This result suggests that a genuine ownership illusion
is triggered in both conditions and by the same type of visuo-
proprioceptive integration process. This result is also consistent
with previous experiments that directly compared the RHI with
active or passive movements to the classical version with the
application of brushstrokes (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014a). That
is, consistent with the idea that different types of multisensory
correlations can elicit the illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2005; Tsakiris
et al., 2006; Walsh et al., 2011; Guterstam et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, whether the motor control processes influence
the moving RHI is still an important unanswered question. The
critical differences between active and passive movements are the
involvement of (i) motor intentions, (ii) comparisons between
the predicted sensory consequences of the movement based on
efference copy and the actual sensory feedback, and (iii) the sense
of agency. These processes, which are intimately linked to motor
control, are only present in the active condition of the moving
RHI. Therefore, the fundamental question here is whether these
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 344
fpsyg-08-00344 March 9, 2017 Time: 15:9 # 7
Kalckert and Ehrsson Moving Rubber Hand Illusion Onset
motor-related processes contribute to the emergence of the
illusion by influencing the multisensory integration of visual,
tactile and proprioceptive information. By comparing active and
passive movements, we can directly contrast conditions that
are matched in terms of visual and proprioceptive feedback,
while differing in terms of agency and motor control processes
(Kalckert and Ehrsson 2012; 2014a). Recent studies, including our
own, show a mixed picture in terms of the results from comparing
the strength of the illusion in active and passive conditions. Some
studies reported a stronger illusion experience (questionnaire
ratings) in active movements than in passive movements (Braun
et al., 2014; Jenkinson and Preston, 2015), and some found a
stronger illusion experience in the passive movement condition
(Walsh et al., 2011). Other studies found no difference when
they quantified the illusion with the proprioceptive drift (Tsakiris
et al., 2006). In our previous studies, we found mixed results.
In Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012), active movements produced
significantly higher affirmative ownership ratings in the active
condition than for the passive condition, but this difference
was relatively small and not reproduced in the proprioceptive
drift. In a later study, we found no significant difference in
the ownership ratings between active synchronous movements,
passive synchronous movements, and a classical condition with
synchronous brush stroking (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014a).
Moreover, a similar proprioceptive drift was observed in the
classical condition and active movement condition (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2014a).
Therefore, it is interesting that we, in the present study, found
significantly higher ownership scores in the active condition
compared to the passive condition. This significantly stronger
illusion in the active condition is also reflected in the significantly
faster onset times for active movements in the subsample of
participants who experienced the illusion in both synchronous
conditions. One possible explanation for this result could be
that the integration of visual and somatosensory feedback
changes depending on whether the feedback is matched by
a sensorimotor prediction (active movements) or not (passive
movements). Motor control processes can affect basic sensory
processes through efference copy mechanisms (von Holst and
Mittelstaedt, 1950; Bays and Wolpert, 2006). Most notably,
somatosensory perception is attenuated during self-produced
touches compared to externally produced touches via central
cancelation mechanisms that are thought to involve sensory
prediction mechanisms in the cerebellum (Blakemore et al., 1998;
Shergill et al., 2003). Future experiments need to determine the
possible contribution of agency and motor control processes in
ownership illusions, and these experiments could benefit from
including illusion onset timings as part of the dependent data.
Our results naturally draw upon some assumptions. We
applied a strict criterion for which participants were subsequently
tested in the onset measurement. We chose to include
participants with an ownership score of ≥ 1 in the synchronous
and ≤ −1 in the asynchronous condition. The threshold values
may be defined differently, but we introduced these for a practical
reason, which is that the difference between synchronous and
asynchronous stimulation is one of the most observed and
reliable effects in RHI experiments (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998;
Tsakiris et al., 2006; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). We measured
the illusion onset in participants who could clearly distinguish the
two different situations of “owning” and “not owning” the model
hand. Therefore, when a participant had a clear experience of the
ownership illusion in the synchronous condition, we could refer
to this ownership experience and explain to participants that we
were looking for the appearance of this particular sensation in
the onset timing experiments, which makes this approach more
reliable because the illusion can be associated with a variety of
different subjective experiences (Longo et al., 2008).
The present results add to the limited literature on the
temporal evolution of the rubber had illusion. The temporal onset
of the illusion can provide a new objective approach for reporting
the illusion beyond the typical questionnaire, proprioceptive-
drift and GSR based measurements that have mainly been used
so far in the literature. Onset times should also be particularly
valuable for future applied research, for which this information
can be incorporated in the design of a variety of applications,
such as advanced prosthetic limbs. Further research is needed
to investigate potential differences between the different versions
of the illusion and the role of the different processes, such as
multisensory integration and motor control processes, in the
experience of ownership of a moving body.
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